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Abstract
Background: Increased digitalization of healthcare comes along with the cost of cybercrime proliferation. This
results to patients’ and healthcare providers' skepticism to adopt Health Information Technologies (HIT). In Europe,
this shortcoming hampers efficient cross-border health data exchange, which requires a holistic, secure and
interoperable framework. This study aimed to provide the foundations for designing a secure and interoperable
toolkit for cross-border health data exchange within the European Union (EU), conducted in the scope of the
KONFIDO project. Particularly, we present our user requirements engineering methodology and the obtained
results, driving the technical design of the KONFIDO toolkit.
Methods: Our methodology relied on four pillars: (a) a gap analysis study, reviewing a range of relevant projects/
initiatives, technologies as well as cybersecurity strategies for HIT interoperability and cybersecurity; (b) the
definition of user scenarios with major focus on cross-border health data exchange in the three pilot countries of
the project; (c) a user requirements elicitation phase containing a threat analysis of the business processes
entailed in the user scenarios, and (d) surveying and discussing with key stakeholders, aiming to validate the
obtained outcomes and identify barriers and facilitators for HIT adoption linked with cybersecurity and
interoperability.
Results: According to the gap analysis outcomes, full adherence with information security standards is currently
not universally met. Sustainability plans shall be defined for adapting existing/evolving frameworks to the state-
of-the-art. Overall, lack of integration in a holistic security approach was clearly identified. For each user scenario,
we concluded with a comprehensive workflow, highlighting challenges and open issues for their application in
our pilot sites. The threat analysis resulted in a set of 30 user goals in total, documented in detail. Finally,
indicative barriers of HIT acceptance include lack of awareness regarding HIT risks and legislations, lack of a
security-oriented culture and management commitment, as well as usability constraints, while important
facilitators concern the adoption of standards and current efforts for a common EU legislation framework.
Conclusions: Our study provides important insights to address secure and interoperable health data exchange, while
our methodological framework constitutes a paradigm for investigating diverse cybersecurity-related risks in the health
sector.
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Background
Advances in Health Information Technologies (HIT)
and digital health are transforming healthcare delivery.
However, the constantly increasing digitalization and the
inherent use of sensitive health data come along with
the cost of cybercrime proliferation. Lack of adequate
security measures result in patients’ and healthcare pro-
viders' (HCPs) unwillingness to adopt HIT, as well as in-
vestors’ skepticism to fund such activities. In the
European context, as the number of citizens who travel
across Europe for education, training, work and tourism
constantly increases, the need for cross-border health
data exchange becomes imperative. Especially, people
suffering from chronic diseases are facing obstacles in
travelling either within or outside their country of resi-
dence, due to the lack of an established, systematic and
secure framework for data exchange among healthcare
organizations across Europe.
KONFIDO is a European Union (EU) funded project
[1], which aims to leverage novel approaches and
cutting-edge technologies, such as homomorphic en-
cryption [2], photonic Physical Unclonable Functions
(p-PUF) [3], a Security Information and Event Manage-
ment (SIEM) system [4], and blockchain-based auditing
[5], in order to develop a holistic paradigm for secure,
cross-border exchange, storage and overall handling of
health data. It builds its solution upon existing/evolving
European frameworks, such as OpenNCP (Open-source
and reference version of the NCP software) [6], which is
the open-source National Contact Point (NCP) software
implementation of its predecessor project named epSOS
(European Partners – Smart Open Services) [7], and
eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust
Services) [8], which stands for the EU regulation on elec-
tronic identification and trust services for electronic trans-
actions in the internal market. An overview of the
KONFIDO technical solution and its links with the above-
mentioned frameworks is presented in [9]. Overall, KON-
FIDO aims to advance the state-of-the-art of HIT along
the four key dimensions of digital security, i.e. data preser-
vation, data access and modification, data exchange, and
interoperability and compliance. To this end, KONFIDO
is organized in four complementary phases, namely, ‘User
requirements analysis; ‘Design’; ‘Technology develop-
ment’; and ‘Integration, testing and validation’. The
current study focuses on the former phase.
As part of the “User requirements analysis” phase, we
first reviewed and mapped applicable technical and legal
frameworks as well as ethical and social norms at the
European level with a major focus on the KONFIDO
pilot-site countries (i.e. Denmark, Italy and Spain). This
entailed a gap analysis study for interoperable and secure
solutions at the systemic level. We then defined and ana-
lyzed user scenarios with major emphasis on cross-border
health data exchange and, based on these, we conducted a
user requirements elicitation phase starting from the def-
inition of the underlying business processes and proceed-
ing to the identification of respective assets, threats and,
ultimately, high-level user goals. Equally important, we
pursued intense interaction with the wider healthcare
community, in order to validate the methods and the
outcomes of our approach, aiming also to identify key
barriers and facilitators for HIT solutions acceptance
linked with cybersecurity. Overall, HIT acceptance in
the clinical environment has been identified as a chal-
lenge and has been investigated (mostly focusing on
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems [10, 11]),
using models based on psychology, sociology, and con-
sumer behavior. To this end, we conducted a survey tar-
geting all possible relevant stakeholders (i.e. HCPs,
hospital staff at IT departments, industrial HIT stake-
holders, and patients/citizens), as well as an end-user
Workshop.
In this paper, we present the overall methodology con-
cerning the user requirements engineering phase of
KONFIDO as well as the obtained outcomes. We con-
clude by consolidating these outcomes in terms of rec-
ommendations for the KONFIDO technical design and
we argue about the usefulness of the proposed methodo-
logical framework for developing secure and interoper-
able health data exchange IT solutions.
Methods
The overall methodological framework adopted for user
requirements engineering focuses on four pillars (Fig. 1).
The methodological pillars are provided in the left-side of
Fig. 1, along with the targeted outcomes in the right-side,
while the arrows linking pillars illustrate their interrela-
tions. A description of each methodological pillar is pro-
vided in the respective subsections below.
Pillar 1: Gap analysis study
Generally, a gap analysis aims to identify “gaps”, i.e. the
qualitative or quantitative differences, between the current
and the target state of the analyzed subject (e.g. product,
process, organization, market, etc.). Current state corre-
sponds to the analysis subject’s present status (i.e. “where
we are”) and target state defines the desired condition
where the analysis subject would satisfy some specific cri-
teria or goals (i.e. “where we want to be”). Such an analysis
typically requires the comparison of current and target
state across a range of criteria. For the current study, the
conducted gap analysis aimed to identify how well our
analysis subjects satisfy a set of requirements regarding
HIT cybersecurity and interoperability.
The gap analysis subjects included several relevant
European initiatives, projects and their outcomes,
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technological artifacts as well as end-user perspectives
and policy strategies across four thematic areas, i.e.:
 HIT Interoperability Frameworks: epSOS [7], Antilope
[12], the Joint Action to Support the eHealth
Network (JASeHN) [13] and SemanticHealthNet [14].
 HIT Security Software Frameworks: DECIPHER [15],
OpenNCP and STORK 2.0 [16].
 End-user perspectives across diverse settings in
KONFIDO pilot countries: Santobono Pausilipon
Hospital (Italy), Odense University Hospital &
Svendborg Hospital (Denmark), and Hospital Clínic
Barcelona (Spain).
 National cybersecurity strategies and reference reports:
Documents regarding the currently applied
cybersecurity strategies in the pilot countries and
relevant reports (e.g. regarding guidelines or best
practices) primarily provided by the European
Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) [17, 18].
The analysis was assigned to Working Groups (WG)
per thematic area within the KONFIDO Consortium.
The analysis subjects were examined by topic experts in
each WG against a gap analysis template (provided in
Additional file 1). This gap analysis template defined an
explicit set of analysis criteria (a.k.a. controls), mostly
based on the ISO/IEC 27k information security stan-
dards family [19]. In the scope of the presented study,
the following ISO standards were employed: (a) ISO/IEC
27002 [20]; (b) ISO/IEC 27010 [21]; (c) ISO/IEC 27040
[22]; (d) ISO 27799 [23]; (e) ISO 22857 [24], and (f )
ISO/IEC 25010 [25].
The template was organized on 11 clauses, defining the
template’s upper–level structure: Security policy; Organiz-
ing information security; Asset management; Human
resources security; Physical and environmental security;
Communications and operations management; Access
Control; Information systems acquisition, development and
maintenance; Information security incident management;
Business continuity management; Compliance, and Usabil-
ity. Instructions and relevant examples on how to use the
template were given to the WGs. In addition, the respon-
dents became aware that some questions contained in the
template might not be relevant for their analysis, due to
the specific scope and/or the varying information granu-
larity of the considered analysis subjects. Finally, itera-
tive teleconferences were conducted among WG
members to discuss the plan, their progress, and finalize
the results.
The gap analysis was mainly conducted via: (a) Desk
research, by reviewing material regarding the analysis
subject, e.g. project reports or deliverables, as well as
papers published in scientific journals or conferences. (b)
Interviews / discussions with experts related with the
analysis subject (either directly involved in KONFIDO or
not). The overall gap analysis methodology along with
some preliminary results were presented in [26].
Fig. 1 The user requirements engineering framework: methodological pillars and main outcomes
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Pillar 2: User scenarios definition
Given the European dimension of KONFIDO, its user sce-
narios focus on cross-border health data exchange. In par-
ticular, two reference scenarios have been defined, the first
focusing on cross-border services for a chronic patient, and
the second elaborating on cross-border and cross-regional
health data exchange, considering triage services in emer-
gency situations. Several stakeholders have been taken into
account in the scenarios’ definition, e.g. public and private
hospitals, HCPs with different roles and patients with di-
verse healthcare needs, as well as various technological arti-
facts (mHealth apps, telemonitoring services, EHRs, etc.).
The aim was to address the heterogeneity of the domain,
considering the three pilot countries of the project. The
second scenario is described in Table 1 [27].
Besides the textual description of each user scenario, a
workflow was defined (for its realization) and analyzed
in detail.
Pillar 3: User requirements elicitation
The term “user requirements elicitation” can be ambigu-
ous in the varying contexts of user requirements engin-
eering. In the scope of this work, we defined it as the
process of exploiting diverse information sources, in
order to “… discover the current project needs and agree
upon its vision and goals” [28]. Our overall approach
aimed at specifying high-level user goals by first defining
the related business processes (BPs), based on the meth-
odology described in Park et al. [29]. User goals in turn
are defined as “abstract user requirements, not directly
referring to specific technical solutions or components”.
They typically refer to specific user actors, while their
definition facilitates early identification of possible con-
flicts between actors and, consequently, their timely
resolution.
The identification of BPs was based on the actions
contained in the textual description of each scenario,
which is a well-established approach [30]. Typically,
“verbs correlate to operations which can be invoked by
components or actors” [31], in order to facilitate the
specification of the system functionality. The user sce-
nario presented in Table 1 is annotated based on the
above rationale by highlighting in bold the key-phrases
implying BPs. The identified BPs were then analyzed by
conducting a threat analysis. Typically, this refers to
the systematic process of identifying and evaluating
spots of vulnerability for a facility, operation, or system,
which is also applicable in the context of HIT [32, 33].
Our threat analysis process involved the following
steps:
1. Asset identification; assets include anything worth
to be protected and can be organized in the following
indicative categories: information, infrastructure
(physical infrastructure, software, etc.), persons,
business functions.
2. Threats identification; threats are uncontrolled
circumstances or actions, typically related with
malicious people or factors out of control
(e.g. weather, physical failures, etc.), which can
obtain control of, damage or destroy an asset.
Table 1 The second reference scenario considered in KONFIDO
Phase 1: Milan
Anna is a 45-year-old university professor living in Milan (Lombardy
Region), Italy. For the summer holidays, Anna and her daughter are
planning a cruise to Barcelona, Spain. Anna suffers from Diabetes
type 2, while her 6-year-old daughter Cristina has heart disease since
she was born. Being a chronic patient, Anna has learnt how to live
with her disease and to manage her daughter’s health too, undertaking
routine tasks such as measuring periodically Cristina’s vital signs (e.g.,
blood pressure), taking medicines, or performing tasks like glucose
measurements and insulin injections. Cristina was enrolled in the
Regional Program called CReG (Chronic Related Groups) and together with
her mother they use a tele-monitoring service. CReG is a program which
delegates the care management of chronic patients to General
Practitioners, supporting them in the prescription, monitoring and
renewal of care plans. The hospital of Milan has equipped both
Anna and Cristina with a tele-monitoring kit for remote monitoring
of their health condition. The kit includes medical devices and a
gateway which sends the measured vital signs to the respective
Service Center in Milan.
Phase 2: Naples
Travelling by car for a conference in Naples (Campania Region) with her
husband and their daughter, Anna experiences a quite serious car accident
and Cristina has serious wounds. The healthcare authorities in Naples,
where the accident takes place, offer an innovative telemedicine
application empowered by KONFIDO. Particularly, using the national
eID technology that KONFIDO recognizes and handles properly, the
retrieval of all the information needed to intervene while in the
ambulance (patient identification, clinical details, immunization details, and
usual therapy) is made possible. Specifically, Cristina’s data are
retrieved from the EHR system of the healthcare authorities in the
Lombardy Region.
Using the telemedicine application and a tablet, Cristina’s personal data
(including pictures of her wounds) are transmitted through the mobile
network to the emergency department by paramedics. Using KONFIDO
technologies, paramedics can safely authenticate her and the encrypted
transmission of her medical data is conducted. The applicationmonitors
the child, suggests actions, possibly re-routes the ambulance, and makes
sure that everything is ready upon arrival at the hospital with the aim to
speed-up the triage process and reinforce the preparedness levels.
Phase 3: Barcelona
After a few weeks, Cristina is discharged from the hospital in Naples
and, given her risky heart condition, the doctor in Milan is immediately
informed by the hospital in Naples that anti-coagulant therapy had to
be interrupted. Consequently, the doctor decides to adjust the therapy
and review the monitoring plan. Cristina and Anna can realize their
vacation plans in Spain using the tele-monitoring service.
Anna and Cristina know that in case of problems, any hospital they
might have to visit in Barcelona will have access to their patient
summaries in Italy. During the journey, Anna faints and she is transferred
to the nearest hospital in Barcelona to check her health condition. While
the Spanish doctor is accessing Anna’s patient summary, a cyberattack
tries to compromise the data exchange. Specifically, an international
hacker group, using a system vulnerability, attacks and takes control of
the NCP in the Spanish OpenNCP deployment. Thanks to KONFIDO
security mechanisms, Anna’s data integrity and confidentiality is protected
against the cyberattack and the doctor can make a diagnosis and provide
the medical treatment.
Terms highlighted in bold indicate verbs or phrases that have been used to
identify the respective BPs in the scenario
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Threats may refer to technical, functional, legal, per-
sonal and political aspects. We focused on technical
threats, which were classified based on the STRIDE
model [34]:
(a) Spoofing: refers to gaining access to a system by using
a false identity.
(b) Tampering: refers to the unauthorized modification
of data.
(c) Repudiation: refers to the denial of specific
actions or transactions on the user’s behalf
(legitimate or not).
(d) Information disclosure: refers to exposure of private
or sensitive data.
(e) Denial of service (DoS): refers to the process of
making a system/application unavailable.
(f ) Elevation of privilege: refers to gaining access to
resources by self-assigning more privileges.
The threat analysis results were combined with best
practices and outcomes produced by relevant projects/
initiatives, in order to define the user goals per actor. In
particular, we took into account: (a) the ISO/IEC 27k
family of standards; (b) outcomes of the gap analysis, the
end-user survey and Workshop conducted in the scope
of the project, as described below; (c) reports from rele-
vant EU projects and initiatives, as well as (d) the re-
cently enforced into practice General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [35], which aims to align data priv-
acy laws among EU Member States.
We defined two types of user goals, i.e. functional and
non-functional, corresponding to functional and non-
functional requirements, respectively. Functional goals
were based on the user scenarios, while the identified
threats per BP were combined with other sources of in-
formation to pinpoint non-functional goals.
Aiming to consolidate and interpret the identified user
goals, a meta-analysis was conducted based on a visual
analytics approach. The aim was to illustrate the de-
pendencies among the identified user goals and the re-
spective information sources, BPs, assets and threats, as
well as the strongest links among them.
Pillar 4: Feedback from key stakeholders
An end-user engagement strategy was employed to val-
idate the prior methodological pillars and their out-
comes, and identify key barriers and facilitators for HIT
adoption linked with security and interoperability. In
particular, an online, anonymous and confidential survey
as well as a Workshop with the participation of key
stakeholders were conducted. The goal of the survey was
two-fold: (a) to identify the currently applied practices
regarding security and interoperability on existing HIT
infrastructures for healthcare organizations of varying
size and nature (e.g. private and public), and (b) to
obtain insights regarding patient/citizen awareness on
cybersecurity risks entailed in cross-border health data
exchange and document opinions about exchanging
health data with HCPs or HIT service providers. Thus,
we discriminated two groups of participants in the sur-
vey: (a) HCPs and HIT stakeholders across Europe, and
(b) patients/citizens.
The overall survey design was built upon key princi-
ples of human psychology [36], while it contained dif-
ferent content per group. Several sources were used
for designing the respective questionnaires, such as
relevant standards, surveys conducted by other organiza-
tions, reports, scientific papers, etc. The questionnaire
structures for both participant groups are provided in
Additional files 2 and 3, respectively.
For the first group, personal invitations were sent, in
order to obtain high-quality, expert feedback. The survey
questions for this group were structured as follows:
1. Organization profile: referred to the organization’s
size and structure (e.g. number of employees,
activities in the domain, etc.).
2. Security facts: focused on security incidents
occurred in the organization, targeting IT stuff
and managers.
3. Security policy: referred to policies applied in the
organization (e.g. existence of security and risk
management policies, use of encryption, etc.).
4. Security incident management: concerned handling
security breaches in a technical level, targeting
technical stuff and managers.
5. Barriers and facilitators: aimed to identify key issues
that facilitate or discourage the adoption of
cybersecurity best practices.
6. Personal view: focused on awareness (e.g. use of
publicly available cloud storage services, importance
of security in everyday work, etc.) and satisfaction
regarding the current cybersecurity state.
Contrary to the survey targeting the first group, the
survey for the second group was circulated publicly by
using patient forums, mailing lists, and social media. It
contained the following sections:
1. Awareness regarding Information Technology risks:
Focused on identifying the level of the participants’
awareness regarding the risks entailed in using
HIT.
2. Legislation: Aimed to identify the patients’/citizens’
familiarity with relevant legislation artifacts.
3. Cross-border medical treatment: Aimed to provide
insights on whether the participant was medically
treated or hospitalized abroad.
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4. Cross-border medical data exchange: Focused on
the participants’ opinion regarding the need for
cross-border health data exchange.
5. Barriers and facilitators: Aimed to identify issues
that facilitate or discourage cross-border health data
exchange from a patient’s/citizen’s viewpoint.
6. Demographics: Contained key information about the
participant, in order to facilitate the statistical
analysis of the obtained data.
The end-user Workshop attracted more than 30 stake-
holders from the HIT and healthcare sectors across Europe;
it was organized to encourage open discussion, exploring
the diverse issues concerning cross-border health data ex-
change. Personal invitations were sent to candidate partici-
pants from diverse organizations (healthcare, standards
developing organizations, HIT associations, regional health-
care authorities, privacy authorities, research/academia,
etc.), aiming to obtain input from the widest possible
spectrum of stakeholders composing the European HIT
ecosystem. The methodological overview along with
preliminary outcomes as regards barriers and facilitators for
HIT acceptance were presented in [37].
Results
In this section, we present the main outcomes of the
employed methodology (Fig. 1). Given the wide range of
the activities carried-out in the scope of this work, we
concentrate on the key parts of the findings.
Outcome 1: Comprehensive user requirements definition
The detailed analysis of the user scenarios highlighted the
challenges and the open issues of applying them in
real-world settings, taking into account the context of the
project’s pilot sites. Figure 2 depicts a part of the workflow
corresponding to the user scenario presented in Table 1,
highlighting actions considered in the senario, the entailed
challenges and open issues, as well as scenario back-
ground information.
The user scenarios analysis resulted in a set of BPs
(listed in Table 2). In order to illustrate the user goals
definition process, we present the analysis of BP2: “Access
Fig. 2 Partial view of the workflow corresponding to the user scenario described in Table 1
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the medical record of a foreign patient”, demonstrating
this way indicative results in each step of the analysis
(Table 3 depicts the assets and Table 4 the identified
threats for BP2, respectively).
These threats were analyzed, taking also into account fur-
ther information sources, e.g. ISO standards, guidelines
produced by other European projects, etc. Based on our
analysis, a set of 30 user goals were defined in total (Tables 5
and 6 demonstrate two example goals associated with BP2).
Aiming to further analyze the identified user goals, we
conducted a meta-analysis using visual analytics. Dia-
grams demonstrating the link among the outcomes of
intermediate analysis steps (i.e. assets and threats), the
original information investigated (i.e. standards, policy
recommendations, etc.) and the final user goals, were
produced. This visualization highlighted the complexity
of these links for specific intermediate outcomes,
information sources and user goals, and gave a broader
overview concerning the overall contribution in the user
goals’ definition by grouping the intermediate analysis
steps and the original information investigated according
to their category. Figure 3 provides an indicative example
visualization, depicting a subset of the links among in-
formation sources (e.g. standards, BPs, reports on the
left side of the figure), intermediate outcomes (assets
and threats, in the middle) and user goals G7, G8 and
G12 (on the right side of the figure). Respectively, Fig. 4
provides an example visualization depicting the overall
contribution of the categories of information sources
considered in our analysis (left side of the figure) and
the categories of intermediate analysis steps (i.e. assets
and threats, in the middle) in the user goals definition
(right side of the figure).
Table 7 demonstrates the quantified contribution of
the most important information categories. Evidently,
ISO standards were the most influential source of infor-
mation in this respect.
Outcome 2: Barriers and facilitators for HIT acceptance
The gap analysis study provided the initial input for this
outcome, since it revealed barriers and constraints as well
as open issues and challenges for information security in
the health sector. This input has been further elaborated
in the Workshop and also through the conducted survey.
As an example, we present the analysis of the everyday
operational processes applied in one of the KONFIDO
pilot sites, the Santobono Pausilipon Hospital (PAUSIL) in
Naples, Italy. PAUSIL is a specialized pediatric hospital
with more than 1000 employees and it demonstrated high
adherence to the controls contained in the gap analysis
template and the respective underlying standards. Never-
theless, some indicative gaps were identified (Table 8).
Table 2 Business processes identified from the user scenarios
ID Business process Description
BP1 Grant access to own Medical Record A patient in the visiting country grants the foreign HCP access to his/her medical
record to facilitate treatment.
BP2 Access the medical record of a foreign patient The HCP accesses a foreign patient’s medical record, e.g. his/her medical
history summary, medication treatment plan, diagnosis and relevant lab
examination results.
BP3 User authentication using the national eID infrastructure The user is being authenticated via his/her nationally-issued eID.
BP4 Transmitting data for remote monitoring The user transmits data using a telemonitoring service.
BP5 Accessing the patient’s medical record while transferred via
an ambulance
Paramedics retrieve data from the patient’s medical record.
BP6 Exchanging triage information, while the patient is transferred
to the hospital via an ambulance
Paramedics transmit triage data to the respective hospital, e.g. wound pictures.
The application transmits patient data in the ambulance and may provide
guidance to the paramedics.
BP7 Exchange of medical information between HCPs HCPs exchange medical information directly, e.g. in the case of a medication
safety issue, and notify the treating physician accordingly. This BP refers to an
active way of communication and not to keeping notes in the patient’s
medical record.
Table 3 Assets identified for BP2: “Access the medical record of
a foreign patient”
ID Description Category Comments
A1 Medical record
information
Information The main asset to be protected.








Information The intention of accessing a
patient’s medical record is crucial.
On the one hand, it could imply
an attack attempt and, in this
case, the medical record owner
should be notified. On the other
hand, it should be protected as it
clearly implies that the doctor
intends to conduct a medical
transaction, and this could contain
sensitive information.
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Overall, the main issues identified through the gap
analysis for the considered analysis subjects can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Full adherence to the targets set by international
standards for information security is currently not
universally met. For example, the processes applied
in the considered hospitals demonstrated high
adherence with the controls proposed by information
security standards. However, compliance with
standards was not evident in the review of the
considered interoperability and software security
frameworks.
2. The analysis of national cybersecurity strategies and
reference reports highlighted the difficulty in
balancing between a high-level document and
actionable information. As a consequence, this
material can be ambiguous for users and, therefore,
the adherence is partly incentivised and arbitrarily
localized.
3. As technology evolves at rapid pace, cybersecurity
artifacts can quickly become outdated. A sustainability
plan for the employed technologies should be
undertaken, in order to enhance user trust. In
some cases, legacy or vulnerable technologies
were identified in the investigated technology
frameworks.
4. Lack of integration towards a holistic security
approach was clearly identified. While, various
interesting technologies are being developed in
parallel, it seems that each project focuses on a
specific technological aspect and integration is not
taken into account to leverage cybersecurity of HIT
as a whole.
The survey focusing on selected stakeholders, i.e. HIT
experts, managers, HCPs and health IT stuff working in
hospitals, resulted in 35 submissions. The open survey
targeting patients/citizens attracted 437 submissions. The
analysis of the submitted responses led to the identifica-
tion of barriers and facilitators regarding HIT acceptance.
For example, barrier B1: “Lack of awareness regarding
information technology risks” was identified due to the
analysis of the responses to the questions “Have you ever
thought about your privacy regarding your health data?”
Table 6 Goal 12: “Prevent ambiguity issues”
G12 Prevent ambiguity issues
Goal Type Functional
Actor(s) HCP, Patient
Reference(s) BP1, BP2, JASeHN deliverable D5.3 (section IV)
Description Semantic ambiguity can be a burden in cross-border health
data exchange. Referencing to diseases and medication
might be confusing in clinical practice due to different drug
brand names, clinical protocols/procedures, etc. KONFIDO
should promote semantic interoperability in order to minimize
these risks.
Table 4 Threats identified for BP2: “Access the medical record of a foreign patient”
ID Type Assets Malicious actors Description/Example scenario
T1 Spoofing All information
assets
Other actors without a clear
role in the BP
An external actor could pretend to be legitimate, in order to get the HCP credentials
and use them to access information (e.g. patient’s medical record), on behalf of
the HCP.
T2 Tampering All information
assets
Other actors without a clear
role in the BP
A malicious user could (perhaps combined with a spoofing attack) modify the
information assets (e.g. the patient’s medical record or the HCP’s credentials) in a
malicious way for social, financial or for personal reasons.
T3 Repudiation All information
assets
HCPs Deny accessing medical information to avoid legal consequences upon an HCP





HCPs and other actors
without a clear role in
the BP
An HCP could provide access to a patient’s medical record, aiming at patient’s





Other actors without a clear
role in the BP
Hinders access to the respective services, aiming to cause damage to the patient





Other actors without a clear
role in the BP
Assign privileges to one or multiple medical records aiming at exploiting or






Other actors without a clear
role in the BP
Stealing the eID card of the HCP could facilitate spoofing, information disclosure
and privilege elevation.
Table 5 Goal 11: “Prevent tampering attacks”
G11 Prevent tampering attacks
Goal Type Non-functional
Actor(s) Other actors without a clear role in the BP
Reference(s) BP2
Description As someone could (perhaps combined with a spoofing
attack) modify the information assets (e.g. the patient’s
medical record or the HCP’s credentials) in a malicious
way for social, financial or personal reasons, KONFIDO
should be able to prevent such kind of malicious actions.
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(depicted in Fig. 5) and “Do you feel well-informed regard-
ing possible health data security risks?” (depicted in Fig. 6),
provided by the patients/citizens group.
As another example, facilitator F6: “Wide recognition of
the need for a security policy based on standards” was
partly identified due to the responses to the question
“Please rank the importance of the issues that you think
might facilitate the adoption of security-oriented best prac-
tices” provided by the selected stakeholders group (Fig. 7).
Similarly, answers to question “Please rank the following
barriers, hindering acceptance of cross-border health data
exchange” provided by the patients/citizens group (Fig. 8)
were linked with barrier B2: “Lack of end-user confidence
on their overall electronic health data handling”.
Overall, the analysis of the survey responses and the out-
comes of the Workshop led to the identification of a com-
prehensive set of barriers and facilitators regarding HIT
acceptance (shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively). The
barriers identified in Table 9 are grouped with respect to
awareness, interoperability, legislation, trust, and usability.
Outcome 3: Recommendations for the technical design
Based on the outcomes from all methodological pillars
(Fig. 1), we concluded with a list of recommendations for
the design phase of the KONFIDO toolkit. Notably, not all
the produced recommendations concern technical aspects
that can be overcome in the context of KONFIDO. Some
of them are quite generic, exceeding the KONFIDO scope.
Fig. 3 Sankey diagram illustrating an indicative view of links among specific information sources considered in the analysis
Fig. 4 Sankey diagram illustrating the overall contribution of the categories of information sources considered in the analysis for goal definition
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Nevertheless, since these can be useful for the designers of
cybersecurity tools in the health domain, we cite below
the full list of recommendations:
R1. Strive for high adherence to standards as this
reinforces end-users’ trust in HIT.
R2. Leverage existing technical frameworks of the
domain (in the European context, e.g. OpenNCP
and eIDAS), but also follow a flexible design to
address technical dependencies to the extent
possible.
R3. Implement state-of-the-art cybersecurity technologies
and measures, while ensuring sustainability of the
technical solutions.
R4. Consider how and where consent is registered as
well as accessed by patients and HCPs.
R5. Adopt a clear and comprehensive data handling
scheme, in order to facilitate its understanding (for
both patients and HCPs).
R6. Usability should be a first-class priority in
cybersecurity technical developments, given that
this constitutes a key acceptance factor for the
end-users.
R7. Implementation details should target the three pilot
countries as there are too many open issues to plan
and conclude in the development of an EU-wide
robust technical solution. A prototype toolkit
targeting the three pilot countries can be used as an
example for the future development of an EU-wide
solution.
R8. Carefully take into account the diversity of
organizational and information workflows
applied in healthcare organizations, and adapt
the technical design accordingly.
R9. Comply with all applicable laws and regulations in
the involved regions and countries, but also with
EU regulations related to HIT. At the same time, be
adaptable to prominent changes regarding legal
issues and take into account that legislation is not
aligned among EU Member States.
R10.The lack of budget to address security aspects by
healthcare organizations dictates that new
cybersecurity technologies shall be cost-effective,
contributing to practical solutions.
Discussion
Principal results
The current study provided a comprehensive set of user
requirements and a set of barriers and facilitators for
HIT acceptance associated with the design of secure and
interoperable HIT, concluding with recommendations
for the technical design phase of cybersecurity solutions
focusing on health data exchange and the KONFIDO
toolkit in particular.
According to the gap analysis, full adherence with infor-
mation security standards is currently not universally met.
In view of the rapid pace of cybersecurity technologies,
sustainability plans shall be defined for adapting existing/
evolving frameworks to the state-of-the-art. Overall, lack
of integration in a holistic security approach was clearly
identified. For each user scenario, a comprehensive work-
flow has been defined, highlighting challenges and open is-
sues for their application in our pilot sites. The threat
analysis resulted in a set of 30, high-level user goals in
total, which were documented in detail, while links among
our information sources and assets, threats and goals were
identified as part of a meta-analysis. The survey and the
Workshop with key stakeholders validated the above-
Table 7 Origin of user goals with respect to the information
asset categories considered in our meta-analysis













Does the analysis subject facilitate or promote
the idea of information security policy
document?
A formal information security policy document does not yet
exist; however, PAUSIL is planning to introduce operational




Secure areas Does the analysis subject facilitate or promote
protecting against external and environmental
threats?
Protection against external and environmental threats is not
centrally documented/planned.
Usability Effectiveness Does the analysis subject facilitate or promote
the operability regarding the respective
security aspects?







Does the analysis subject facilitate or promote
management of removable media?
No formal procedures are enforced for the management of
removable media
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mentioned outcomes. Indicative barriers of HIT acceptance
include lack of awareness regarding HIT risks and legisla-
tions, lack of a security-oriented culture as well as usability
constraints, while important facilitators concern the adop-
tion of standards and the efforts to establish a common le-
gislation framework across EU. To this end, GDPR is a
significant step forward which will certainly affect the man-
agement of patient data and the design of HIT systems.
However, its detailed analysis exceeds the scope of our user
requirements engineering methodology and, therefore,
GDPR is not further elaborated in this paper.
The overall outcomes obtained from the presented
user requirements engineering methodology were con-
solidated as recommendations for the design of cyberse-
curity solutions. Despite the fact that some of these
recommendations do not concern technical aspects that
can be overcome in the context of KONFIDO, we stress
their importance, as they can provide significant insights
for the design and development of cybersecurity solu-
tions in the healthcare domain at large.
Limitations
As our study relies on multiple methodological steps,
various limitations per step can be identified. In par-
ticular, the gap analysis study entails the subjectivity
in both the obtained responses and the interpretation
of the analysis subjects. As a mitigation action, we
extensively discussed and tried to clarify cases of
vague/unclear input across the respective WGs. When
necessary, we contacted the producers of the analysis
subjects (e.g. consortia of the considered projects) for
clarifications. The employed gap analysis framework
(template) did not specifically address cross-border
data exchange, storage and management, which is the
main objective of our project. In addition, while relying
on ISO standards and having an adequate level of detail
concerning information security, the employed gap ana-
lysis template might not cover all possible conditions.
Nevertheless, we believe that potential missing aspects
will be identified and addressed as the technical devel-
opment evolves.
Fig. 5 Answers to question “Have you ever thought about your privacy regarding your health data?”
Fig. 6 Answers to question “Do you feel well-informed regarding possible health data security risks?”
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The user scenarios were driven by the current setting of
the KONFIDO pilot sites. Given the project setup, the
pilot studies for assessing the KONFIDO toolkit will be
conducted in three European countries. Thus, it is pos-
sible that our analysis missed cybersecurity-related aspects
that are applicable in other European countries. In order
to overcome this limitation, the conducted end-user sur-
vey targeted a broad audience, aiming to obtain input
from the widest possible spectrum of stakeholders com-
posing the European eHealth ecosystem.
Overall, as the study of other HIT ecosystems (e.g. the
case of exchanging health data among different hospitals
in US) is out of the current work’s scope, the European
focus of the study can be considered as a limitation per se.
Nevertheless, the heterogeneity which is met across the
different national healthcare systems in Europe constitutes
Fig. 7 Answers to question “Please rank the importance of the issues that you think might facilitate the adoption of security-oriented best practices”
(for readability, only the most popular responses are presented)
Fig. 8 Answers to question “Please rank the following barriers, hindering acceptance of cross-border health data exchange”
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a unique characteristic that is worth investigating. Our
study outcomes could also be generalized and exploited in
the context of exchanging data in other contexts, e.g. with
other countries outside EU. For example, the Trillium-II
project [38], which focuses on EU-US cooperation and
particularly on exchanging patient summary data, could
find our outcomes useful both regarding barriers, facilita-
tors and end-user goals, as well as our technical advances.
Raising awareness about cybersecurity for health data ex-
change requires intensive synergies, in order to build the
necessary cybersecurity-oriented culture and address the
respective barriers that were identified in our study.
Table 9 Barriers for HIT acceptance linked with cybersecurity and interoperability
ID Description Expected impact on technical design and/or the overall KONFIDO
project activities
Category
B1 Lack of awareness regarding information technology
risks
Need to reinforce awareness on cybersecurity risks associated with
healthcare delivery.
Awareness
B2 Lack of end-user confidence on their overall electronic
health data handling
The technical design shall account for a comprehensive and
transparent data handling scheme.
Trust
B3 Lack of trust to private companies providing HIT
services
The solution should focus on using infrastructure in the most
transparent way possible.
Trust
B4 Lack of interest regarding the “Terms and Conditions”
for using HIT services
▪ Need to make “Terms and Conditions” more comprehensive for
all users.
▪ Need to support the implementation of a comprehensive and
transparent data handling scheme.
Trust
B5 Inadequate level of legislation awareness Need to promote awareness on legislation aspects. Awareness
B6 Lack of perceived effectiveness of legislation by
end-users
Need to explain and illustrate the effectiveness of legislation to
end-users.
Trust
B7 Lack of clear and transparent consent processes
currently applied
Need to design a comprehensive consent mechanism. Trust
B8 Legislation not aligned among EU Member States Need to track ongoing legislation initiatives and adapt the technical
design accordingly.
Legislation
B9 Immaturity of existing frameworks Need to reduce strong dependencies with such frameworks to the
extent possible.
Usability
B10 Partial lack of management commitment Need to raise awareness on cybersecurity risks associated with
healthcare delivery.
Awareness
B11 Lack of a cybersecurity-oriented culture in everyday
operations
Need to raise awareness on the cybersecurity risks associated with
healthcare delivery.
Awareness
B12 Lack of budget Need to raise awareness on the impact of cybersecurity incidents and
the economic burden that these may entail.
Awareness
B13 Usability reduced due to IT security measures Need to prioritize usability in the technical design process. Usability
B14 Inadequate use of established cybersecurity mechanisms
(e.g. active directory, intrusion detection systems, etc.)
Need to promote the use and added value of novel/standard
cybersecurity mechanisms.
Awareness
B15 Diversity of information workflows among
organizations
Need to contextualize the technical design, in order to accommodate
the requirements of local healthcare delivery processes and therefore
increase end-user acceptance through enhanced usability.
Usability
B16 Free-text content in different languages Need to employ reference medical terminologies/encodings to address
interoperability.
Interoperability
B17 Legislation not aligned among EU Member States Need to follow ongoing legislation initiatives and adapt the design
according to EU directives.
Legislation
B18 Legal issues not clarified (e.g. data ownership, liability etc.) Focus on provenance and auditing mechanisms, in order to clarify
details if/when needed and, therefore, increase trust on the overall data
exchange process.
Legislation
B19 Lack of inter-organizational trust Need to promote robust and transparent cybersecurity measures while
illustrating the added value of health data sharing (e.g. considering
patient safety, quality of care, etc.).
Trust
B20 Complexity of consent process Need to design a comprehensive consent mechanism for patients. Usability
B21 Lack of available IT expertise in organizations Need to raise awareness about the required personnel to address
cybersecurity risks in organizations delivering healthcare services.
Awareness
B22 Data exchange agreement’s complexity Need to establish data exchange agreements compliant with
legal norms.
Usability
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Comparison with prior work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic
study presenting and applying a comprehensive, user re-
quirements engineering methodology for the design of se-
cure and interoperable HIT. Our methodology included a
broad range of activities, starting from a gap analysis study
which reviewed a wide range of relevant projects/initia-
tives, technological artifacts as well as end-user organiza-
tions’ policies and national cybersecurity strategies. User
scenarios have been defined and analyzed in detail, focus-
ing on three pilot sites and cross-border health data ex-
change. The respective user requirements elicitation phase
containing a threat analysis of the business processes
entailed in the user scenarios, defined assets, threats and,
ultimately, high-level user goals. Finally, an end-user sur-
vey and a Workshop with the participation of diverse
stakeholders validated the obtained outcomes of the previ-
ous steps and identified key barriers and facilitators for
HIT adoption linked with cybersecurity. Overall, the
presented methodology is aligned with best practices [39]
and established methods in the domain of requirements
engineering for digital health, with respect to require-
ments elicitation and validation [40], as well as security
requirements identification [41].
Conclusion
This study enabled us to define a comprehensive set of
user requirements, a set of barriers and facilitators for
HIT acceptance and, ultimately, a set of recommendations
for designing a toolkit for secure and interoperable health
data exchange in Europe. We argue that our results pro-
vide important insights to the domain, while our
methodological framework constitutes a paradigm that
can be reused for investigating other kinds of cybersecu-
rity-related risks in the health sector. Equally important,
the identified barriers and facilitators for HIT acceptance
may constitute a useful guide for HIT stakeholders in re-
inforcing the adoption of their solutions by the targeted
end-users (i.e. HCPs and patients/citizens).
Additional files
Additional file 1: The gap analysis template. (XLSX 36 kb)
Additional file 2: Survey structure for HIT Stakeholders. (XLSX 15 kb)
Additional file 3: Survey structure for Patients-Citizens. (XLSX 14 kb)
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Table 10 Facilitators for HIT acceptance linked with cybersecurity and interoperability
ID Description Expected impact on technical design and/or the overall KONFIDO project activities
F1 The need for HIT services and applications tends to
overcome the insecurity regarding personal data misuse
It confirms the need for solutions that provide added value in real-world healthcare
settings, while still promoting a holistic security approach.
F2 End-users support cross-border data exchange (even
for research)
It confirms the value of the KONFIDO key concepts. Does not affect design
decisions.
F3 Common legislation activities between EU Member
States
GDPR and other initiatives will form the legal base for the solution and guide the
respective design decisions (e.g. on the consent process).
F4 Technical EU initiatives are currently ongoing The design will create a liaison with and build upon existing/evolving frameworks in
Europe (epSOS, OpenNCP, eIDAS).
F5 Standards already established and widely accepted The design and implementation will follow security standards, such as those from
ISO/IEC 27k.
F6 Wide recognition of the need for a security policy based
on standards
The technical solution should be based on widely-accepted standards and therefore
implicitly increasing compatibility with standard based security policies.
F7 Exchange of data between organizations is based on
agreements following GDPR
The design shall take GDPR into account wherever applicable (e.g. in the design of
the consent process).
F8 Common mechanism of eID currently built (eIDAS) The design of the solution shall be based on eIDAS, which is expected to be the
de-facto standard among EU Member States.
F9 Cloud services, compatible with medical data exchange
legislation
KONFIDO will be able to use cloud infrastructure being compatible with the respective
legislation.
F10 Credible network services available Facilitate the engagement in high mobility scenarios.
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